Man Sentenced in $1.5M Fresno County Fraud Scheme

Jafaar September Nyangoro received a prison term and restitution order for conspiring to defraud the county through fraudulent invoices.

Updated on Nov. 9, 2026 in Financial Crime

Man Sentenced in $1.5M Fresno County Fraud Scheme

Jafaar September Nyangoro, 53, of Franklin, Tennessee, was sentenced to three years 10 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,178,000 in restitution for conspiracy to commit wire fraud against Fresno County. U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston imposed the sentence.

Why it matters

The case shows how a compromised nonprofit email account can be used to redirect government payments to a fraudulent bank account. It highlights the financial exposure public agencies face when vendor banking details are changed without adequate verification.

Nyangoro pleaded guilty on June 22, 2026, and was sentenced on November 9, 2026, after being in custody since his initial appearance on May 29, 2025. The restitution figure of $1,178,000 is lower than the more than $1.5 million in transfers sent to his account.

The players

Jennifer L. Thurston

U.S. District Judge who imposed the sentence on Nyangoro in federal court.

Regions Bank

Regional U.S. bank that reversed some of the fraudulent ACH transfers in October 2020.

The details

Nyangoro, co-defendant Peter Bah Acha, and others gained control of an email account used by the finance director of a Fresno nonprofit. Posing as the finance director, the group submitted fraudulent invoices to the county and convinced employees to update the nonprofit's bank account information to an account Nyangoro opened at a different bank.

Between Sept. 24, 2020, and Oct. 13, 2020, Fresno County sent several ACH transfers totaling more than $1.5 million to Nyangoro's account.
On Oct. 16, 2020, Regions Bank reversed some of the transfers for suspected fraud.
Nyangoro pleaded guilty on June 22, 2026.
Nyangoro was sentenced on November 9, 2026.

Legal Context

The scheme follows a pattern in which criminals take over legitimate email accounts to impersonate finance staff and alter payment instructions. Cases like this one show how public agencies that accept electronic vendor payments can be targeted through routine account-change requests.

Local governments and nonprofits that receive or send ACH payments may face similar schemes if vendor bank information is changed by email. Verifying banking changes through a separate, known phone contact can help prevent diverted funds.

The takeaway

Requests to change payment or bank account details should be confirmed through an independent channel before any funds are sent. Verification steps like this can stop a single compromised email from redirecting public money.